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IN THE UTAH COlQRT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CaseNo.20020966-CA
vs.
RICHARD NORRIS,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A Statute's Unconstitutionality is a Jurisdictional Defect. Upon entering his
guilty pleas in this case, Appellant, Richard Norris ("Mr. Norris") waived only nonjurisdictional defects. Although a guilty plea waives claims of constitutional violations
alleged to have occurred prior to a guilty plea (i.e. unlawful search and seizure), jurisdictional claims are an exception to this general rule. It is sound reasoning and well settled
in federal courts that a challenge to a statute's constitutionality is a direct challenge to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, and that a statute's unconstitutionality divests the trial court
of jurisdiction. Mr. Norris is challenging the constitutionality of the communications
fraud statute, specifically alleging that it is overbroad and void for vagueness; thus Mr.
Norris is directly challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court. Therefore, Mr. Norris did
not waive his right to appeal his convictions when he entered guilty pleas in this case.

The Overbreadth of the Statute is Both Real and Substantial. In scrutinizing
legislation that places limits upon the free exercise of speech, it is critical to recognize
that it is the statute, and not the specific facts of the individual case, which prescribes the
limits of lawful conduct. Therefore, regardless of the facts of a specific case, if a statute
restricts constitutionally protected conduct in a manner that is both real and substantial, it
is unconstitutionally overbroad regardless of any legitimate application. The United
States Supreme Court has determined that the First Amendment to the federal constitution
affords some protection to falsehoods, recognizing that some falsehoods must be protected in a society that values and protects free speech. However, the broad and sweeping
language of the communications fraud statute criminalizes all falsehoods, whether those
falsehoods are conveyed by omission or commission, directly or indirectly, employing
merely false or insincere behavior, for the purpose of obtaining anything of value.
Vagueness Encourages Arbitrary and Discriminatory Enforcement The
communications fraud statute contains words and phrases that are not readily understood
by persons of ordinary intelligence. Examples illustrating the genuine difficulties
inherently associated with interpreting such terms as "artifice" or "anything of value"
previously set forth in Mr. Norris's BRIEF OF APPELLANT (Br. Appt") were not
"hypertechnical" figments of the imagination, as the state suggests. Rather, they were
common scenarios that occur in everyday life which illustrate how certain prevalent yet
diverse and often harmless behavior can easily fit within the punishing parameters of the
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communications fraud statute. Moreover, because the statute is so vague, it not only
permits, but it encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
ARGUMENT
I.

A STATUTE'S UNCONSTITUTIONALITY IS A JURISDICTIONAL
DEFECT THAT DIVESTS THE TRIAL COURT OF JURISDICTION.
The state claims that Mr. Norris waived his right to appeal the constitutionality

of Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 when he pleaded guilty in this case. The state further
cites as dispositive the language in State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989) (quoted
in State v. Hardy, 54 P.3d 645, 648 (Utah Ct. App. 2002)1) which provides that a defendant who pleads guilty "waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea
constitutional violations." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1278 (emphasis added). The
state also concedes that Mr. Norris is not precluded from challenging the trial court's
jurisdiction. Not only is the state's argument flawed, but its position is inconsistent with
the very authority it cites.

!

In State v. Hardy, the defendant entered into a plea in abeyance agreement on a
misdemeanor charge. He was later convicted for felonious violations of a protective
order which were also hejd to be in violation of the terms of the plea in abeyance
agreement, and resulted in him being sentenced on both the misdemeanor and the
subsequent felonies. Appealing his convictions on the basis that the controlling statute
was unconstitutional, this Court determined that the defendant waived any challenge to
any constitutional defects when he pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor. However, it does
not appear that the defendant in that case raised the issue that a statute's
unconstitutionality is a jurisdictional defect. Accordingly, it does not appear that this
Court has ever addressed this specific question.
3

Although it does not appear that this issue has been directly addressed in Utah
appellate courts, the rationale underlying the wise and widely adopted principle that an
unconstitutional law deprives a court of jurisdiction is supported by Utah Code Ann. §783-4(1), which bestows jurisdiction upon the district courts "in all matters . . . not excepted
in the [state] Constitution and not prohibited by law (emphasis added). Presumably, a
statute that is unconstitutional is, by definition, excepted by the Constitution. Moreover,
it is clearly prohibited by constitutional law, thereby depriving the district courts of
jurisdiction as a matter of law.
Federal precedent provides additional support to this conclusion and further
clarifies identical principles already adopted, if not yet fully addressed, by Utah courts.
Using language strikingly similar to that set forth in Parsons above and relied upon by the
state as "dispositive" in this case (BRIEF OF APPELLEE ("Br. Appe.") at 6), the Ninth
Circuit Court clarified the distinction between "pre-plea constitutional violations" and
"jurisdictional claims": "Although a guilty plea generally waives all claims of constitutional violation occurring before the plea, 'jurisdictional' claims are an exception to this
rule." United States v. Caperell, 938 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States
v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1989), amended at 907 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1990). In
other words, constitutional claims that are also jurisdictional are not waived by a guilty
plea.
As further clarification, the same court stated plainly that "claims that the
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applicable statute is unconstitutional or that the indictment fails to state an offense are
jurisdictional claims not waived by the guilty plea." United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d
at 552 (quoting United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1261 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1979), cert,
denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979)). In other words, a guilty plea waives pre-plea constitutional
non-jurisdictional violations, such as an unlawful search and seizure, but not constitutional claims that by their nature, divest the trial court of jurisdiction over the matter.
Several other courts have consistently followed this same sound reasoning, and
in many of these cases, the United States Supreme Court declined to review. See, United
States v. Rivera, 879 F.2d 1247, 1251 (5th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 998 (1989);
United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314 (6th Cir. 1994); O'Leary v. United States, 856 F.2d
1142, 1143 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. DiFonzo, 603 F.2d 1260, 1263 (7th Cir.
1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980).
Moreover, the Due Process Clause contained in the Fifth Amendment to the
federal constitution proves problematic when the government obtains a conviction under
an unconstitutional statute, or via the unconstitutional application of a statute. The
practical effect of the Due Process Clause in such a circumstance is to simply deprive the
trial court of jurisdiction from the outset and invalidate the conviction. For example, in
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), a defendant residing in North Carolina pleaded
guilty to a misdemeanor and was then subsequently convicted by a jury of a felony
offense for the same conduct, in violation of prohibitions against double jeopardy. The
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high court stated that because of the constitutional violations inherent in the second
prosecution, "the very initiation of the proceedings against [the defendant] . . . thus
operated to deny him due process of law. . . . The 'practical result' dictated by the Due
Process Clause in this case is that North Carolina simply could not require Perry [the
defendant] to answer to the felony charge." Id. at 30-31.
The ultimate result in Blackledge v. Perry would have been no different if Perry
had pleaded guilty to the charges in the second prosecution, because the constitutional
violations, and thus the due process deprivations, are identical in both circumstances. In
either scenario, the district court ultimately lacked jurisdiction over the unconstitutional
prosecution and conviction of the second case. Yet if the state's arguments in this case
were adopted, a defendant who pleaded guilty twice to the same offense would be
precluded from challenging the second conviction under the procedural facts of this case.
Because a statute's unconstitutionality is a jurisdictional defect, Mr. Norris's
guilty pleas do not preclude him from raising his constitutional challenges on appeal.
II.

THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE IS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD.
A.

SECTION 76-10-1801 FAILS TO REGULATE WITH NARROW
SPECIFICITY.

The state argues that Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 only prohibits falsehoods
made (or omitted) knowingly, intentionally, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, and
that such are not protected by the First Amendment. Although courts generally afford
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statutes a strong presumption of constitutionality, they "will not infer substantive terms
into the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must be based on the
language used, and [courts have] no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an
intention not expressed. . . . Further, because First Amendment freedoms need breathing
space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity."
IML. v. State, 2002 UT 110, f25, 61 P.3d 1038 (citations omitted).
The state concedes that an overbroad statute that prohibits both protected and
unprotected behavior may be facially invalid, regardless of its legitimate application to
the facts in a specific case. Br. Appe. at 10. Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 is overbroad
because it imposes criminal sanctions for all falsehoods, rather than regulating with
narrow specificity. Thus it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct in a manner that
is both real and substantial. Notably, the state does not dispute Mr. Norris's claim that the
communications fraud statute prohibits all communications made with at least a reckless
disregard for the truth.2 Indeed, the crux of the state's argument with regard to
overbreadth is simply that any false communications made intentionally, knowingly, or
with a reckless disregard for the truth are not protected by the First Amendment.
Accordingly, given the undisputed fact that a scheme or artifice to obtain anything of
value is presumed to exist when any false communications are made, the narrow issue for

2

Mr. Norris has previously argued that a falsehood or lie presumes the existence of
a scheme or artifice to at least obtain anything of value, and the state has not disputed this
argument.
7

purposes of this appeal is whether any falsehoods made with the requisite intent are
protected by the federal and state constitutions.
B.

SECTION 76-10-1801 CRIMINALIZES ALL FALSEHOODS,
SOME OF WHICH ARE EXPRESSLY PROTECTED BY THE
FIRST AMENDMENT.

From the outset, the state concedes that "the First Amendment affords a measure
of protection to 'some' falsehoods in order to provide breathing space necessary" for free
exercise of protected speech. Br. Appe. at 13-14. Indeed, "[t]he First Amendment
requires that we protect some falsehoods in order to protect speech that matters." Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (emphasis added). Any legislative enactment that violates the First Amendment cannot be justified on the basis that "such
limitation [is] intimately related to substantial government interest in preventing fraud and
protecting public safety . . ." Village ofSchaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
445 U.S. 972 (1980); see also, Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)
(holding that a municipality may not enact regulations in the interest of public safety,
health, welfare or convenience that abridge individual liberties secured by the constitution). Legislation that imposes criminal liability for all falsehoods is not only overbroad
such that it abridges protected speech in a manner that is both real and substantial, it is
unwise.
"Although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional
protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free debate. As James Madison
pointed out in the Report on the Virginia Resolutions of 1798: 'Some degree of
abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing; and in no instance is this
8

more true than in that of the press.' 4 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution of 1787, p. 571 (1876)."
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 340. However, citing New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the state argues that such "breathing space" does not
extend to falsehoods made knowingly, intentionally, or with a reckless disregard for the
truth. Br. Appe. at 14. This conclusion is problematic for the state for several reasons.
The falsehoods at issue in an action for defamation of a public figure, such as
those in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, are not provided constitutional protection if
made with actual malice, or in other words knowingly, intentionally, or with a reckless
disregard for the truth. However, the state's reliance on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
does not address the glaring fact that (1) not all falsehoods are defamatory; and (2) by
definition, all falsehoods are made either knowingly, intentionally, or with a reckless
disregard for the truth and encompass at least an artifice to obtain anything of value.
"Falsehood" is defined as "deception," "the telling of lies; lying," "lack of
honesty," "treachery," "dishonesty," "deceitfulness," "perfidy." WEBTERS NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, Second Edition (1983), p. 661. If a person conveys a
false impression unknowingly, unintentionally, or without at least a reckless disregard for
the truth, they may be mistaken, but not dishonest, not treacherous, not deceitful, nor a
liar. In other words, they have not communicated a falsehood; rather, they have communicated perhaps a misunderstanding. The definition of "falsehood" therefore presupposes
an intent or scienter often exceeding a reckless disregard for the truth. A falsehood is a
9

lie, not a mistake. Indeed, it is easy to conceive of several examples of non-defamatory
and relatively harmless falsehoods made knowingly and intentionally.
The state also does not deny Mr. Norris's claim that §76-10-1801 prohibits all
falsehoods, defamatory or otherwise; and "[w]here regulations of liberty of free discussion are concerned, there are special reasons for observing the rule that it is the statute,
and not the accusation or the evidence under it, which prescribes the limits of permissible
conduct and warns us against transgression." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98
(1939). The understanding that a "falsehood" cannot exist without at least a reckless
disregard for the truth compels the conclusion that even some falsehoods made knowingly, intentionally, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, are protected speech, since
by definition, all falsehoods are made with specific intent.
A definition of "artifice" was also set forth in Mr. Norris's Brief, and includes
"false or insincere behavior." Given this definition, a falsehood is an artifice, because the
making of a falsehood necessarily entails false or insincere behavior. Further, it is only
logical to conclude that a person who knowingly perpetuates a falsehood does so for the
purpose of obtaining "anything of value", in light of the broad and vague meaning of such
a subjective term. Thus, because all falsehoods are made with specific intent, encompass
an artifice, and seek some subjective value, §76-10-1801 criminalizes all falsehoods.
Indeed, the bigger challenge is to conceive of a falsehood that does not fit within the
broad parameters of the communications fraud statute.
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Because the communications fraud statute criminalizes all falsehoods or lies,
defamatory or otherwise, and in a manner that is both real and substantial, it is unconstitutionally overbroad. Moreover, although the state cites authority for the proposition that a
statute will not be deemed facially invalid if it is readily subject to a limiting construction
(Br. Appe. at 11), the state provides no example of such a limiting construction or any
guidance as to how a limiting construction might be developed and applied to the
unconstitutionally overbroad provisions of the communications fraud statute.
Based upon the foregoing facts and law, the Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 is
unconstitutionally overbroad.
IIL

SECTION 76-10-1801 IMPLICATES CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH; NOTWITHSTANDING, IT IS IMPERMISSIBLY
VAGUE IN ALL OF ITS APPLICATIONS
Mr. Norris has already addressed the manner in which the communications fraud

statute implicates protected speech in the previous section. Accordingly, he will not
reiterate those arguments but incorporates them herein by reference. Notwithstanding,
§76-10-1801 is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. A statute is void for
vagueness if persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning.
Provo City v. Thompson, 44 P.3d 828, 834 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted). A
statute which fails to adequately notice prohibited conduct is unconstitutionally vague.
State v. Morrision, 31 P.3d 547, 553 (Utah 2001). Further, "to avoid chilling the exercise
of vital First Amendment rights, restriction of expression must be expressed in terms
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which clearly inform citizens of prohibited conduct and in terms susceptible of objective
measurement." I.M.L. v. State, 460 Utah Adv. Rep. at ^|25 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). "[A] statute, which readily lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement
by local prosecuting officials, against a particular group [or individual] deemed to merit
their displeasure, results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of
discussion that might reasonably be regarded as within its purview." Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. at 97-8.
Section 76-10-1801 provides that a scheme or artifice to defraud or to obtain
"anything of value" meets the requirements of the statute. The term "anything of value"
cannot be objectively measured, as required for a statute to survive constitutional scrutiny
The term "value" by itself is a vague, broad, relative and subjective term3; and under the
plain language of the statute, "anything" of value is fair game. For example, a wife may
obtain value, simply because she esteems it as such, when she intentionally lies to her
husband to facilitate her extramarital affair. Because the value sought via her scheme or
artifice is not susceptible to objective measurement, her admittedly intentional dishonesty
constitutes a second degree felony, exposing her to a punishment of 1-15 years in prison
and a fine of up to $10,000. £ven if the state, perhaps out of the kindness of its discre-

3

"Value" is defined as "fair price", "the equivalent of something in money", "that
quality of a thing according to which it is thought of as being more or less desirable,
useful, estimable, important,", "that which is desirable or worthy of esteem for its own
sake; thing or quality having intrinsic worth", "valued". WEBSTERS, supra, p 2018.
12

tionary heart, declined to prosecute the offender, it is this very potential for arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement that makes a statute void for vagueness, and provides yet
another reason why the communications fraud statute melts under the fervent heat of
constitutional scrutiny.
The state does not dispute or address the fact that §76-10-1801 requires no intent
to defraud. Rather, the state ignores this troubling fact and cites Hill v. Colorado, 530
U.S. 703 (1950), suggesting that the imagination might conceive of any number of
hypothetical scenarios to stretch the meaning of any statutory term beyond reason. Br.
Appe. at 17. In the Hill case, the appellant challenged the constitutionality of a Colorado
ordinance that prohibited anyone from approaching, within 8 feet, another person for the
purpose of engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling, without the approached
person's consent. The Supreme Court held that the terms of the ordinance were not vague
because persons of common intelligence would understand the conduct prohibited. Hill
argued that the term "approaching" was unconstitutionally vague, disingenuously opining
that the term did not clarify whether a person's outstretched arm might impermissibly
breach the imposed 8-foot boundary. Understandably dismissing the appellant's contention as "hypertechnicaL" the Supreme Court rejected the claim that the statute would not
be understood by ordinary persons, explaining that "because we are condemned to the use
of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language." Id. at 732-33.
In Hill, the ordinance set a specific, narrow, objectively measurable 8-foot "value," as it
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were. In stark contrast, §76-10-1801 significantly broadens the prosecutorial possibilities
with its subjective and therefore unmeasurable "anything of value," particularly taken in
the context of the additionally vague "indirect" "conveying" of false information via
"material omission" to further an "artifice" (i.e., false or insincere behavior). Indeed, the
state could not have picked a better contrast in the Colorado ordinance challenged in Hill
to the statute at issue in this case.
The state claims that the statutory terms "artifice," "communicate," and
"anything of value" are not vague, despite the fact that the state does not dispute Mr.
Norris's claim that the broad language of the statute effectively criminalizes all falsehoods made knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly. First, the state claims that the term
"artifice" is understood by people of common intelligence. Br. Appe. at 16. This claim is
perhaps somewhat disingenuous. The term "artifice" is not generally used in common,
every day speech. Most ordinary people would likely require a dictionary to obtain the
common meaning.4
Likwise, the term "communicate" is not simply overbroad, but it is also vague.
Although at least the statute attempts to define this term, the term "communicate" is
nonetheless defined using vague terms that persons of common intelligence would

4

This fact is evidence by the record in a companion case, State v. Mattinson, Case
No. 20030474-CA, when during deliberations, the jury requested a definitions for
"anything of value" and "artifice," apparently concluding that the defendant's conduct did
not constitute a scheme to defraud, thus requiring them to determine if it was an artifice to
obtain anything of value.
14

interpret differently. As the state concedes, "communicate" includes every conceivable
form of communication, and is defined as simply as to "convey" or "transmit information." UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1801 (6)(a). In the additional light of the fact that a
person is criminally liable under §76-10-1801 if false information is merely "conveyed"
"indirectly" and via "material omission," the vagueness of these terms is further revealed
in their vague context. Indeed, because §76-10-1801 is so vague and therefore broad, it
easily encompasses many other offenses, such as forgery, false information to a peace
officer, prescription fraud, unlawful use of a transaction card, identify fraud, and writing
bad checks, to name a few. In short, any crime of dishonesty is communications fraud. It
would seem that the legislature did not intend to punish the person who lies to a private
citizen about his identity (a second degree felony) more severely than the person who lies
to a police officer about the same thing (a class B misdemeanor).
In determining whether §76-10-1801 is void for vagueness, the fact that the
statute implicates constitutionally protected conduct is dispositive. However, the
additional fact that the vague language used in the statute fails to adequately notice
proscribed conduct renders the statute void for vagueness and impermissibly vague in all
of its applications.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts and law, Appellant, Richard Norris, respectfully
requests this Court to vacate his convictions on the grounds that Utah Code Ann. §76-10-
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1801 is unconstitutional in that it is both overly broad and void for vagueness. Mr. Norris
also respectfully requests that this Court find that a statute's unconstitutionality is a
jurisdictional defect, and that Mr. Norris therefore did not waive his right to appeal the
matter when he entered guilty pleas in this case.
Respectfully submitted this ' f e ^ d a y of April, 2004.
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC
, ,.. /

L

Jennifer K. Gowans
Attorneys for Defendant
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